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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (j) pursuant to an Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court entered April 16, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I Appeal of the Judgment and Underlying Orders is 
Properly Before This Court. 
POINT II. Under the Clear and Unambiguous Terms of the 
ME&LS Operating Agreement, Dale Bennett Did Not 
Terminate His Employment with the Company 
(ME&LS) So Is Still a Member of ME&LS. 
POINT III. The Relevant Language of the Operating 
Agreement Is Not Ambiguous and the Intentions 
of the Parties Are Clear from a Plain Reading 
of the Operating Agreement. 
POINT IV. Plaintiffs' Position Ignores the Clear Language 
of the Operating Agreement and Unnecessarily 
Relies on Irrelevant Facts Outside the 
Operating Agreement. 
POINT V. Proper Construction of the Clear Language of 
the Operating Agreement Does Not Lead to Absurd 
Results or to Nullification of its Terms. 
POINT VI. Plaintiffs' Attempt to Restructure the 
Operating Agreement, Without Notice to Bennett, 
Is Invalid and a Violation of Judge Boyden's 
Previously Announced Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming, among other 
things, that the resignation of Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") 
as an "employee" of McNeil Engineering, Inc. ("MEI") 
automatically constituted a "withdrawal" by him as a 
"member" of McNeil Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC 
("ME&LS"). Following briefing and argument on the parties' 
Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Judge Ann 
Boyden ruled that Bennett remains a member of ME&LS and is 
entitled to all of the benefits of a member. Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider was denied by Judge Pat Brian. 
Thereafter the District Court, Judge Brian, entered a 
Judgment in favor of Bennett for Bennett's unpaid 
percentage share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Scott F. McNeil ("McNeil") formed McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI") in 1983, and since has been the 
sole owner of MEI. (R.1168) 
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2. Upon its formation, Bennett became an employee of 
MEI and remained an employee of MEI from 1983 until he 
resigned as an employee of that company on August 17, 2005. 
(R.1187; R.6630) 
3. In 1996, McNeil formed three limited liability 
companies associated with MEI to perform the services to 
clients theretofore carried on by MEI itself. ME&LS was 
one of the three LLCs created. (R.1169-1170, 1173; R.6627) 
4. MEI remained the employer of all personnel and 
leased them to ME&LS and to the other two companies. 
(R.1178) MEI also provided administrative services through 
its staff employees for all of the companies. (R.1175-
1177; R.6628) MEI has provided no engineering services 
since 1996. (R.1174) 
5. Bennett became a 25% member owner of ME&LS at its 
inception in 1996 and thereafter rendered services on ME&LS 
projects as a leased "employee" of and for MEI. (R.6628) 
In 2005 Bennett owned 252 shares for a total of 26.53% of 
the membership interest in ME&LS. (R.6618) 
6. Both McNeil and Bennett were managers, but never 
employees, of ME&LS. (R.6601) In fact, ME&LS has never 
had any employees. All services on ME&LS projects were 
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provided to ME&LS by leased employees working for MEI, not 
for ME&LS. (R.1178; R.6628, emphasis added.) 
7. Both McNeil and Bennett understood from the 
beginning that Bennett was an employee of MEI. (R.1175; 
R.5445) 
8. MEI provided all of the services required of an 
employer to all of its employees, including Bennett. 
(R.5444-5445) 
9. An Amendment No. 2, dated November 1, 2 0 01, to the 
Operating Agreement ("Operating Agreement") of ME&LS 
provided in Sec 12.1 that a member 
"shall cease to be a member . . . upon the 
withdraiwal of a member," 
and in Section 12.3 that 
na member shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the 
member's employment with the Company for reasons 
other than bankruptcy, death, disability or 
incompetence." (R.6618-21, emphasis added.) 
10. Under definitions of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement, in Section 1.10, the "Company" is defined as 
"McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, L.C., a 
liability company formed under the laws of Utah, 
and any successor company." Id. 
11. MEI is not referred to in either the Operating 
Agreement or in Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No. 2, nor is 
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there any definition of "employment," "employee" or 
"withdrawal." There is also no reference to the term 
"leased employee." 
12. On August 17, 2005, Bennett submitted a letter to 
McNeil stating that he was resigning his employment with 
MEI. (R.2600-2601) Bennett did nothing to waive, sell or 
otherwise give up his valuable ownership interest in ME&LS. 
13. In August, 2006, the parties filed cross motions 
for summary judgment on Bennett's status as a member of 
ME&LS and his rights, if any, as a member. (R. 2510-2581; 
R.2585-2644) 
14. On November 17, 2006, Judge Boyden ruled that 
Bennett is still a member of ME&LS and is entitled to: 
"All of the rights of a member, including, for 
example, the same right to current information, 
accounting, disbursements, and other benefits that 
any other member of ME&LS is entitled to receive." 
(R.3119-22) That ruling was confirmed by Judge Boyden's 
Order dated December 21, 2006. (R.3119-3123) 
15. None of the documents related to ME&LS had ever 
referred to MEI until an Amendment No. 4 was purportedly 
adopted on November 29, 2 006, without notice to Bennett, 
just twelve days after Judge Boyden7s ruling on November 
17, 2006. (R.5772-75) 
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16. Amendment No. 4 is a clear attempt to -overrule and 
void Judge Boyden's Order. See Attachment 1. Amendment 
No. 4 omitted Bennett as a member and his membership 
interest was transferred to McNeil and the other members of 
ME&LS. Id. 
17. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider Judge 
Boyden's Order which was denied by Judge Pat Brian on April 
2, 2008. (R.6791-6793) 
18. During the year 2005, ME&LS made distributions to 
members totaling $320,136.10. These distributions were 
paid out quarterly. In January 2005, a distribution of 
$100,000 was paid, and Bennett was paid $26,526.32, or 
26.53%. In April 2005, a distribution of $90,000 was paid 
and Bennett was paid $23,873.68, or 26.53%. In September 
2005, a distribution of $30,136.10 was paid. In November 
2005, a distribution of $100,000 was paid. Bennett was not 
paid his share of either the September or November 
distributions. (See Yearly General Ledger Detail Report. 
Bates numbered ME 0009934, attached as Exhibit 2.) (R.6432-
6433) 
19. During the year 2 006, ME&LS made distributions to 
members totaling $4 05,74 0.40. In February 2 0 06, a 
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distribution of $105,740.40 was paid. In April 2006, a 
distribution of $90,000 was paid. In July 2005, a 
distribution of $100,000 was paid. In October 2005, a 
distribution of $100,000 was paid. Bennett was not paid 
his share of any of the distributions paid to all the other 
members during 2 0 06. Id. 
20. In January, 2007, Bennett filed a Motion for Order 
of Judgment seeking an order requiring payment to him of 
his unpaid share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006 
in the amount of $142,974.42. (R.6432-6435) Id. 
21. On December 21, 2 0 06, Judge Boyden granted that 
motion subject only to an accounting as to what funds 
Bennett had received and what he had not received. 
(R.6421-6427) 
22. On April 3, 2008, following briefing and oral 
argument, Judge Brian entered an Order and Judgment in 
favor of Bennett in the amount of $142,174.93, representing 
Bennett's share of unpaid distributions in 2005 and 2006. 
The Court also found that there was no just reason for 
delaying entry of the judgment and certified the judgment 
as final. (R.6791-6793) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During the time Bennett was an employee of MEI from 
1996 until he resigned as an employee on August 17, 2005, 
MEI provided to him all of the services and support usually 
provided by an employer to its employees. 
Bennett has never been an employee of ME&LS. ME&LS has 
provided no employer support or services to Bennett. In 
fact, ME&LS, as structured by McNeil, has never had any 
employees. 
McNeil's contention that Bennett's status and 
termination of employment as an "employee of MEI" somehow 
automatically constitutes his "withdrawal as a member of 
ME&LS" is a forced and strained construction beyond any 
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the ME&LS 
Operating Agreement or of Amendments 1 or 2. Bennett's 
work was performed for, and as an employee of MEI, on tasks 
MEI undertook for ME&LS. 
The District Court properly ruled that the ME&LS 
Operating Agreement is unambiguous and that Bennett remains 
a member of ME&LS. 
The District Court properly entered the Order and 
Judgment in the amount of unpaid member distributions for 
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2005 and 2006 because McNeil did not have a right to offset 
uncertain, unproven, disputed and unliquidated claims 
against the distributions Bennett should have received. 
The District Court's determination that there was no just 
reason for delay was proper under the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT AND UNDERLYING ORDERS IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
This appeal is taken by ME&LS from both the Judgment 
and the underlying Orders of December 21, 2 0 06 and April 2, 
2008. The Judgment was certified as final under Rule 56(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by the District Court, 
and it was determined that "there is no just reason for 
delay." 
This appeal meets the three requirements set out by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991). First, there are 
"multiple claims for relief' by "multiple parties" to this 
action. Second, "the Judgment and certification entered 
would otherwise have been appealable absent the other 
claims," and the District Court made a determination "that 
there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
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POINT II. UNDER THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF THE 
ME&LS OPERATING AGREEMENT, DALE BENNETT DID NOT 
TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY 
(ME&LS) SO IS STILL A MEMBER OF ME&LS. 
Under the unambiguous wording of the Operating 
Agreement, in order to withdraw as a member, Bennett had to 
resign his "employment" with ME&LS. The unwarranted 
interpretation plaintiffs attempt to apply to the ME&LS 
Operating Agreement contradicts the plain and simple 
meaning of its terms. The undisputed facts are that 
Bennett was never employed by ME&LS. He resigned his 
employment from a totally separate and independent company, 
MEI. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to ignore the plain 
language of the Operating Agreement and rule that upon his 
resignation from MEI he withdrew from ME&LS which is a 
wholly different entity. This transparent attempt to apply 
terms of the ME&LS Operating Agreement to MEI is without 
support in any documents related to either of these 
entities. 
Because Dale Bennett was not employed by and did not 
resign his employment from ME&LS, his membership interests 
and ownership rights in ME&LS could not have been affected 
by his August 2 0 05 resignation under the very clear and 
carefully crafted provisions of the ME&LS Operating 
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Agreement or under the provisions of any document related 
to MEI. Plaintiffs' argument would require the Court to 
ignore the plain language of the Operating Agreement. 
ME&LS is a manager-managed limited liability company. 
The ME&LS Operating Agreement is the governing document for 
this company. Section 1.10 of the Operating Agreement 
defines "Company" as "McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying." This definition is determinative of the 
question of law before the Court. Plaintiffs want the 
Court to overlook this very clear definition and create, 
then import into the Operating Agreement, provisions that 
have no basis in fact, or in usual or customary use, or in 
any document related to either of these entities. Those 
documents say what they say and are not subject to 
manipulation by McNeil to suit his present interests. 
The parties do not dispute that the provisions of 
Amendment No. 2 to the Operating Agreement pertaining to 
the dissociation of a member govern Bennett's membership 
status in ME&LS. It is also uncontested that under Section 
12.1 of Amendment No. 2, a person ceases to be a member if 
that member withdraws as a member. Section 12.3(a) 
provides: 
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"For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be 
deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily 
resigns or terminates the Member's employment with 
the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, 
death, disability or incompetency.'7 
(Emphasis added.) However, at no time has Bennett 
terminated or withdrawn as a member of ME&LS. His status 
and his role as a member and manager of ME&LS must not be 
confused with his role as an employee of MEI. 
POINT III. THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT 
IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THE INTENTIONS OF THE 
PARTIES ARE CLEAR FROM A PLAIN READING OF THE 
OPERATING AGREEMENT. 
The interpretation of a contract begins with the 
examination of the contract itself. See Utah Transit 
Authority v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., Inc., 2006 
UT App 46, 131 P. 3d 288 ("When interpreting a contract, a 
court first looks to the contract's four corners to 
determine the parties intentions, which are 
controlling.")(quotations and citations omitted)); Trolley 
Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P. 2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (same) . uIf the contract is in writing and its 
language is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions should 
be determined from the words of the agreement." Turner v. 
Hi-Country Homeowners Association, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 
(Utah 1996) / see also ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 
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968 P.2d 861 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(holding that if a 
contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must 
construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary 
meaning). "When the contract is not ambiguous, the court 
may not look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
terms therein," Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, M.D., 
2005 UT App 92, 110 P.3d 168. 
Section 12.3(a) of the ME&LS Operating Agreement is not 
ambiguous. The plain and ordinary meaning of its terms are 
not contested here. To constitute a withdrawal as a 
member, paragraph 12.3(a) requires that the member 
voluntarily resign or terminate his employment with "the 
Company." This provision could arguably be ambiguous if 
the term "Company" was not a defined term in the Operating 
Agreement. "Company", however, is defined only as McNeil 
Engineering and Land Surveying. Therefore, the "plain and 
ordinary meaning" of the terms are that in order to be a 
withdrawing member, the member must voluntarily resign or 
terminate his employment with ME&LS. That simply has never 
happened in this case because Bennett has never been an 
employee of ME&LS. He has not resigned or terminated an 
employment he has never had. 
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Bennett stated in his August 17, 2005 letter of 
resignation, UI therefore resign as an employee of McNeil 
Engineering, Inc." Thus, Bennett was always employed by, 
and only resigned his employment from, MEI not from ME&LS. 
A plain and simple interpretation of the Operating 
Agreement is that Dale Bennett is still a member of ME&LS 
because he has not withdrawn as a member pursuant to the 
clearly defined terms of the Operating Agreement and his 
letter of resignation. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS' POSITION IGNORES THE CLEAR LANGUAGE 
OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND UNNECESSARILY 
RELIES ON IRRELEVANT FACTS OUTSIDE THE OPERATING 
AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to look beyond the plain 
meaning of the terms of the Operating Agreement and 
conclude that Bennett is no longer a member of ME&LS 
because his August 17, 2005 "resignation" from MEI was uin 
effect" also a "withdrawal" from ME&LS. This strained 
attempt to write new and wholly unsupported terms into the 
ME&LS Operating Agreement is patently wrong. See Utah 
Transit Authority, 2006 UT App 46 at \ 12 (stating that to 
merit consideration, an alternative interpretation must be 
based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language 
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used and may not be the result of a forced or strained 
construction). 
Plaintiffs' argument cannot succeed because they 
attempt to interpret the Operating Agreement using terms 
that are nowhere found within it. MEI, Bennett's employer, 
is not mentioned anywhere in the ME&LS Operating Agreement. 
Bennett's resignation from MEI can have no impact on his 
ownership interests in ME&LS. Bennett's membership rights 
in ME&LS stand separate and apart from his status as an 
employee of MEI. 
The fact that Bennett was one of many employees leased 
by MEI to ME&LS is immaterial to the question before the 
Court. Because Bennett was employed by MEI, he could have 
been leased to any of the three McNeil LLCs, or he could 
have remained as an employee of MEI itself, or ME&LS could 
have leased employees from another employee leasing 
company. To whom MEI chose to lease Bennett is not 
relevant to the interpretation of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument that Bennett's close day-
to-day association with ME&LS somehow changed his actual 
employment status and therefore the meaning of the express 
terms of the Operating Agreement must be rejected. 
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Plaintiffs are distorting the undisputed facts about 
Bennett's employment in order to deprive him of his right 
as a member of ME&LS. 
POINT V. PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE 
OPERATING AGREEMENT DOES NOT LEAD TO ABSURD 
RESULTS OR TO NULLIFICATION OF ITS TERMS. 
Plaintiffs claim that any interpretation of Section 
12.3 of the Operating Agreement, other than their own, 
would necessarily "nullify" its terms and lead to "absurd" 
results. A review of that section, however, demonstrates 
that such is not the case. section 12.3 provides in 
material part that: 
UA member shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the 
member's employment with the company . . . " 
To begin with, ME&LS had the ability, never invoked, to 
hire employees of its own to perform the same services as 
those that were being performed by leased employees from 
MEI. Thus the word employment clearly would have 
application had ME&LS decided, or should it at some point 
decide, to hire employees. The word termination cannot be 
applied to Bennett as a member or as a manager of ME&LS 
because he did not either voluntarily resign or terminate 
as to ME&LS. His only termination was as an employee from 
16 
a wholly different entity, ME I. Thus, plaintiffs' claim 
that his resignation as an employee of MEI triggered his 
withdrawal from ME&LS is nonsensical. 
Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that 
under usual, accepted and customary business practice, the 
role, rights and duties of an "employee" of a corporation 
differ markedly from the role, rights and duties of a 
"member" of an LLC. Plaintiffs do not want to recognize 
that under usual and customary practice, the resignation of 
an "employee" from a corporation has no effect on the 
employee's position as a "member" of a clearly distinct and 
different entity, an LLC. Plaintiffs also refuse to 
acknowledge that under the usual and customary business 
practices, employees of an employee leasing company do not 
become employees of the company that leases their services 
from their employer simply because services for the leasing 
company's client are provided by the leasing company's 
leased employees. This is so even though these services 
benefit their employee's client. Nor is there a limitation 
on the kinds, quality, or volume of work a leased employee 
can perform for his employer's clients. 
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It is a simple fact that employee leasing companies 
lease their employees to perform services for their 
employer on work undertaken for clients of their employer, 
often at the client's place of business. And leased 
employees of a leasing company often perform such services 
for multiple clients. That fact does not make them 
employees of each of the leasing company's clients. 
As applied to this case, that relationship has existed 
where Bennett, as an employee of MEI, the employee leasing 
company, directed the work of MEI's other employees to 
perform the work for MEI on engineering and surveying 
projects of MEI's client, ME&LS. The work of both Bennett 
and the other employees was for their employer MEI who was 
by that means meeting its obligation to perform on projects 
of MEI's client, ME&LS. That didn't make them employees of 
ME&LS. Under plaintiffs' construction, where a leasing 
company's employees worked on different projects for 
multiple clients it would make them employees of each such 
client. That result would indeed be absurd. And if, as 
plaintiffs claim, Bennett became the employee of ME&LS, was 
he also at the same time still an employee of MEI? That 
result would also be absurd. 
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POINT VI. PLAINTIFFS7 ATTEMPT TO RESTRUCTURE THE OPERATING 
AGREEMENT, WITHOUT NOTICE TO BENNETT, IS INVALID 
AND A VIOLATION OF JUDGE BOYDEN'S PREVIOUSLY 
ANNOUNCED ORDER. 
It is significant that plaintiffs' statement of 
material facts does not include or even refer to ME&LS 
Amendment No. 4 that was adopted November 29, 2 0 06, without 
notice to Bennett. That Amendment purports to eliminate 
Bennett's membership interest and apportion the same among 
McNeil and the other members of ME&LS. This attempt to 
write off and appropriate Bennett's membership came after, 
and was in direct violation of, Judge Boyden's ruling. 
Within twelve (12) days following Judge Boyden's 
ruling, and in clear violation of the terms and effect of 
that ruling, McNeil deliberately proceeded, unilaterally, 
and without any notice to Bennett, to retroactively 
restructure the Operating Agreement to terminate and 
appropriate Bennett's valuable membership interest. 
Without permission of the Court on the very matter that 
was pending before the Court for resolution, and without 
notice to Bennett, plaintiffs added new terms to the 
Operating Agreement to accomplish what the Court had denied 
and what they have claimed was already provided in the 
Agreement before that amendment was adopted. If plaintiffs 
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truly believed their interpretation of the Operating 
Agreement was valid, they would not have needed to provide 
in Amendment No. 4 what they claim was already provided 
under the existing terms of the Operating Agreement. These 
actions show contempt for Judge Boyden's ruling and also 
demonstrate the lengths to which McNeil will go to damage 
Bennett financially. 
Rather than show respect for the Court's ruling and 
pursue a proper course to seek a reversal, the plaintiffs, 
unilaterally and without notice, took prompt action to 
overrule and void that ruling retroactively by self help. 
And despite that ruling the plaintiffs have still refused 
to accord any of those member's rights to Bennett. They 
still have refused to pay distributions or give Bennett any 
required notice of their attempted manipulation of ME&LS' 
core documents. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Judge Boyden confirmed by Judge Brian and 
the Order of Judgment of Judge Brian should be affirmed. 
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of December, 2008. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
>ed L. Martineau 
Keith A. Call 
Derek J. Williams 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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RE: McNeil Engineering v. Bennett 
Our File No. 16709-002 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed for your records is a copy of Amendment No. 4 to the Operating Agreement 
of McNeil Engineering & Land Surveying, LC, which was signed by the managers and the majority 
of the members on November 29,2006. Based on this Amendment, Dale K. Bennett is now deemed 
to have withdrawn as a member of ME&LS. Because he continues to engage in a business or 
enterprise that competes with ME&LS, the purchase price for his membership interest is an amount 
not exceeding what Mr. Bennett paid for the interest. If there is some discussion you would like to 
have about this Amendment, please contact me. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Matthew C. Barneck 
MCB.fc 
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McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC 
THIS AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into 
as of November jA » 2006, by and between the parties who have signed this Amendment No. 4 
(this "Amendment^. 
R E C I T A L S 
A. Scott F. McNeil, Dale K. Bennett, D. Bradford Petersen, Kenneth A Petty, D. 
Gregg Meyers and Michael D. Hoffman entered into an Operating Agreement with an effective 
date of January 1,1997, and amended August 1,2000, by that certain Amendment No. t to 
Operating Agreement, and again on November 1,2001, by that certain Amendment No. 2 to 
Operating Agreement, and again on May 2* 2006, by that certain Amendment No. 3 to Operating 
Agreement {the "Operating Agreement*0, for McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, LCtfhe "Company"). 
B> The parties hereto desire to amend the Operating Agreement to reflect various 
changes in the Operating Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby amend the Operating Agreement as 
follows; 
1. Section 1.26 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
Managers ~ Members selected to manage the affairs of the Company under 
Article yil hereof. 
2. Section 7.1 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
Managers. The ordinary and usual decisions concerning the business 
affairs of the Company shall be made by the Managers. The Managers 
must be Members of the Company. The Managers are Scott F. McNeil, 
Theodore J. Didas, D. Bradford Petersen, Michael D. Hoffman and 
Kenneth A. Petty. 
3. The first paragraph of Section 11.3 is hereby amended by substituting 60% in place of 
75% 
4. Section 11.3.2 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
.No Member shaUbeexpeUednvithout ctt1east3d daysprtoriwtitenTioiiee* which 
sJrallstate reason for expulsion and shall besignedby Members holding a tiQ% 
TrttfoTiipinterestto: the Company. 
5, fJecfion 12.3(a) is hereby -amended to?ead in its entirely as Allows: 
(a) For purpose^ of this &ectloi% a Member shall be <%emed~to withdraw when 
the Member, voluntarily resigns orierihiriafes:th6Meriib& 
with fhe Cajqparfyorawqffliated&% IneJkidbtg 
McKe1fEngfa&&&. bui^fbr reasons otJtoihmbarfo^tcyr death, 
disability or. incompetency. 
6. Section 12,3- i$ hereby amendedfcylhe addition: 6f thefollowtag,.pxl$aragraph:, 
(e) kot^thsianding^proyfsitm hereto* to ihe c&ntowyt; In the eventja 
Member ffiyohmiarffy terminates the Member^^n^(^e^wliftthe 
CompotyoMtfy c0iated entity qfthe Compw^, ty<fl^i%Mffieft 
Engineering* Inc., 'pidtyfzontfritw 
officer, etnpToytei^nMlftmt, ag&nt 0rvfberyvisefa#ty&^ or 
enfej^iset^^ompete^wt^^ Company or'ffi<$4ffJfo$tiieering, Jhci in 
anpyrayi ifopiwlfaep^ 
MqfaerShtp Interest* 
The Operating Agteeme^sMimam foreeandeffept andshaH imaik unaltered, 
except to the ettsk.s^oificedlyamfended her&a. 
Tht> Amendment msy beslgned in several counterparts, through the. use of ;rmdtiple 
signature pages -appended to- each original, ^ nd attach counterparts'sh l^l constitute one and the 
sariie instrument' Atiy epuntiacpart to wbieh is.^ tachcid the signatures of all parties .shall 
constitute an original of this Amendment 
TN WTTNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the date 





Michael p . Ho; 
MBtfBERS: 
0K«all4i.cH».tm<^.wp<i 
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